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ABSTRACT 
The concept of „conservatism‟ in game design has been a subject of debate for a number 
of years. This „conservatism‟ is linked to „player-centricity‟ in design. Such player-
centricity can be suggested to place a limit on the fulfilment of high level cognitive player 
needs. A framework is thus proposed for disruptive game design that focuses on the 
player and how they learn about game components. It actively seeks the disruption of 
knowledge construction as well as the recall process used in applying that knowledge to 
new situations. Such disruption aims to increase the player‟s cognitive engagement with 
the game in a way that does not entirely prevent them from understanding the game, 
which may cause frustration or confusion. This design approach thus aims to provide 
greater potential for fulfilment of a player‟s high level cognitive needs. The framework is 
applied to a small case study of the game Amnesia: A Machine for Pigs (The Chinese 
Room, 2013) that was designed and developed utilising its principles. 
Keywords 
Schema, disruptive game design, cognition, memory, development-led research. 
‘CONSERVATISM’ IN GAME DESIGN AND THE NEEDS OF PLAYERS 
The dominant trend within contemporary computer game design is suggested to be one of 
player-centric and monologic design (Wilson and Sicart, 2009, 2010), placing the 
fulfilment of the player‟s needs and desires in the position of highest importance and also 
ensuring a high degree of accessibility for players. This trend is suggested to represent an 
“intrinsic conservatism” (Wilson and Sicart, 2010, p.41) within the medium.  
The notion of „conservatism‟ has been identified by academic and industry professionals 
for a number of years and remains a current debate. In 1998, Costikyan (1998) suggested 
that risk-averse publishers subsequently “constrained [the] imaginations” of designers, 
limiting them to the use and reuse of particular game concepts if they were to 
successfully attain a publishing deal. At this time, Herz (1998) discussed a conservatism 
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“rut” and suggested the cause to be too much focus being placed on technological 
advances, while advances in the field of design suffered. Herz‟s article has recently been 
republished (Herz, 2013) with emphasis placed on the ongoing relevance of the issues 
originally raised. Dymek (2010, 2012) echoes Herz‟s suggestion of design innovation 
suffering due to a heavy focus on technological advancement in his discussion of what he 
terms specifically a “creative conservatism” (2010, p.46). 
„Conservatism‟ as identified by Wilson and Sicart (2010) is suggested to be evident at a 
design theory level, existing across a range of current game design literature and thus 
codified as „best practice‟ in terms of what designers should aim to achieve in their 
games. It is suggested that design is the process of fulfilling player desires and ensuring 
usability and accessibility of the game by placing the player at the centre of the game 
experience (i.e. player-centric design). Adams (2010, p.30) provides a similar supporting 
definition, suggesting that the designer has both “a duty to entertain” as well as a duty “to 
build the game to meet the player‟s desires and preferences for entertainment”. 
From the perspective of the player, rather than the designer, the notion of „conservatism‟ 
may be considered in terms of how players construct knowledge about a game as they 
play, how that knowledge enables ongoing in-game learning and thus, how it enables 
successful continued play. This knowledge construction process can be understood using 
Crawford‟s (2003, p.115) definition of an incremental accretive design process as a basis. 
Crawford suggests this process as one of designing by taking existing game designs and 
making minor adjustments or additions to them. This can be suggested to extend to the 
process of knowledge construction during gameplay in the form of incremental accretive 
learning. If only minor adjustments or additions have been made to a game as compared 
to other available games then the amount of new knowledge construction, or learning, 
required by the player will be similarly minimal (i.e. the game is more readily accessible). 
Player-centric, accessible games present players with a simple „starting state‟ to which 
other game mechanics are incrementally added as the player discovers them or the game 
introduces them. These newly discovered mechanics form a more and more complex 
„play state‟ via incremental accretion. The Metroid or Zelda games (Nintendo, 1986-2010 
and Nintendo, 1986-2013) epitomise this approach, providing players with very limited 
initial mechanics with which to progress, gradually allowing the discovery of new items, 
weapons and tools that incrementally build on the previous play state. However, given the 
significant importance of fulfilling the needs and desires of players that is described in 
definitions of player-centric design, it is necessary to consider precisely what „needs‟ and 
what „desires‟ such games may actually be capable of fulfilling. 
 
Figure 1: Hierarchy of Needs, following Schell (2008, p.127) and 
Maslow (1943). 
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Schell‟s (2008) collection of conceptual „lenses‟ for perceiving the game design process 
includes “The Lens of Needs” (2008, p.127) which utilises the hierarchy of human needs 
(Figure 1) originally proposed by Maslow (1943). Schell suggests that many common 
game activities are focused on the needs of „achievement‟ and „mastery‟ of skills (e.g. to 
jump, dodge and shoot enemies in Metroid or to use the available tools to navigate the 
environment in Zelda), placing them at level four of the hierarchy, „self-esteem‟. 
However, in order to ensure the fulfilment of these needs, the player is only ever 
challenged, as Wilson and Sicart (2010, p.2) state, “within the limits of what an implied 
player model suggests”. The challenge likely requires incremental accretive learning as 
opposed to more significant cognitive engagement in the form of substantive „new‟, non-
incremental learning. Higher level needs (i.e. those at level five, „self-actualisation‟) that 
are predominantly cognitive in nature are therefore potentially less likely to be fulfilled 
through such „limit-bounded‟ challenges in games. 
This paper considers how it may be possible to retain the underlying principle of player-
centric design (i.e. player need fulfilment) but to place more focus on fulfilment of high 
level cognitive needs alongside fulfilment of the achievement and task-mastery needs. 
The aim is thus to encourage a greater degree of cognitive engagement through 
challenging players to engage more frequently in „new‟, non-incremental learning during 
gameplay and importantly, to sustain this challenge throughout a game without needing 
to construct elaborate new game components. This position is presented via disruptive 
game design (Howell, 2011). This is a design approach that emphasises ways in which 
previously learned game information, including how such information is stored and 
recalled from memory, can be co-opted to create situations in which players are 
challenged to cognitively engage with the process of understanding and choosing an 
action, rather than simply challenged to demonstrate their skilful performance of actions. 
This approach encourages frequent „new‟ learning as well as active re-learning and 
reconstruction of understanding of game components throughout a game. 
A SIMPLE MODEL OF KNOWLEDGE CONSTRUCTION AND RECALL 
In order to design in a way that influences how players construct knowledge during 
gameplay (i.e. „ludic knowledge‟) and how they acquire an understanding of game 
components, a cognitive basis for knowledge processing and use is necessary. Being such 
a widely researched area, there are a range of available models that could be used as such 
a basis. In the context of ludic knowledge construction, Mayer‟s (2001) model of 
multimedia learning provides a particularly relevant example of such a basis (Figure 2). A 
key component in this model is the active integration of prior learned multimodal 
knowledge (both visual and auditory) into working memory (Baddeley, 1992, 2007) 
alongside incoming information from the game. The combination of each of these types 
of knowledge allows the player to understand what they perceive during gameplay. 
 
Figure 2: Model of multimedia learning, following Mayer (2001). 
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However, the contents and structure of long-term memory and the method of information 
recall through which prior knowledge is integrated are less clearly defined. It is not 
suggested for example how information is encoded into long-term memory, nor how it is 
stored and organised. Nor is it defined how working memory selects and integrates 
appropriate information for the current situation from the large amount of knowledge 
potentially available. This is vital information that is required if the content of long-term 
memory and the process of selection will be affected via disruptive design. 
MULTIMODAL STRUCTURE OF LONG-TERM MEMORY  
Tulving (1985) proposed the idea of the existence of multiple different memory types 
within long-term memory. These types are defined as procedural memory, semantic 
memory and episodic memory and these definitions remain in current usage within a 
range of psychological work (Crittenden, 2013, Pitel et al., 2007, Weiner, Healy and 
Proctor, 2012). At a high level, procedural memory stores information regarding actions 
and processes; semantic memory stores concepts related to objects or phenomena and the 
properties of those objects/phenomena; episodic memory stores memories of personally 
experienced events, which may include elements of both other types of memory 
combined. Episodic memory is organised in relation to spatiotemporal information (it 
contains information relating to when and where, as well as what), while procedural and 
semantic memory store information independently of contextual information (Table 1). 
Integration of prior knowledge from long-term memory may draw upon all of these 
memory types to differing extents. If one is learning to perform a task, such as using a 
new input device to control a character on a screen, then recall and integration may come 
primarily from procedural memory. Alternatively, if one is learning factual or conceptual 
information, such as character attributes, weapon and armour statistics or particular 
weaknesses of enemies in a role-playing game, recall and integration may come primarily 
from semantic knowledge. Each of these types of knowledge construction are informed 
and contextualised further by any relevant prior knowledge of similar personal 
experiences (episodic memory), such as the last time the person learned how to use a new 
device, or the last role-playing game that they played. However, recall and integration of 
prior knowledge must be driven by a process that prioritises the most relevant 
information and ignores less relevant information. Such a process must be facilitated by 
an organisational structure within each of these memory types. 
 
Type of 
Information 
Gameplay Information Example 
Procedural 
Memory 
Actions, 
Processes 
The pattern of attacks required to defeat an enemy. 
The sequence of button inputs required to perform attacks. 
Semantic 
Memory 
Facts, Concepts 
The concept of a generic game „enemy‟. 
The properties of a particular game enemy instance. 
Episodic 
Memory 
Personal Events, 
Personal 
Experiences 
Personal memory of fighting a particular enemy in a 
particular game. 
 
Table 1: Memory types and example stored information. 
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SCHEMA-BASED ORGANISATION OF LONG-TERM MEMORY 
While organisation of long-term memory remains a debated topic, schema theory 
provides a particularly useful structure with which to consider learning during gameplay 
and in turn, disruptive game design. 
Schema theory was introduced by Bartlett (1932) into „mainstream‟ psychology and 
further built upon by a range of other theorists (Minsky, 1974, Neisser, 1976, Piaget, 
1970, Rumelhart and Norman, 1976, Schank and Abelson, 1977). The idea of a mental 
schema itself is now most often perceived as a cognitive structure that contains patterns 
or behaviours in an organised fashion that can be used to help understand interactions 
with the world (Plant and Stanton, 2013). Neath (1998, p.328) and Arbib (1998, p.43) 
also note the key role that mental schemas play in forming expectations about aspects of 
the world, which may influence decisions and behaviours. That is, expecting a particular 
response from the world (or game) following an action may predispose an individual to 
deciding to perform that action. Such predisposition provides one possible focus for 
disruptive game design via the disruption of cause (input) and expected effect. 
Schematic Organisation of Procedural Memory 
Schematic organisation within the three memory types differs slightly due to the different 
information being stored. Procedural schemas (Turner, 1994) are hierarchical or linearly 
arranged plans of action that are carried out in response to a type of situation (loosely 
referred to as a „stimulus‟ in this context).  
Procedural schemas contain only directly relevant information and are not contextualised 
with spatiotemporal information. The process is stored as generic „process‟ and „action‟ 
information in a linear structure, with two hierarchical levels that describe high level 
processes supported by lower level actions (Figure 3). Recall and integration of this prior 
knowledge alone would be meaningless however (outside of a gameplay session, for 
example) and thus it must be integrated alongside other semantic and episodic 
information that can provide context for the process and actions. 
Schematic Organisation of Semantic Memory 
Within semantic memory, a similar hierarchical organisation of information is proposed 
although at a more complex level. A schema in semantic memory is simultaneously both 
a store for abstract concepts and facts (properties) related to them, as well as specific 
information regarding concept instances of that abstract concept (Cohen and Murphy, 
1984, Komatsu, 1992). Figure 4 provides an example of this using the „Firearm‟ concept. 
A 'Firearm' schema, may contain abstract properties such as 'has a trigger', 'requires 
ammunition' and 'requires aiming skill', along with specific concept instances that fit the 
abstract schematic definition, such as 'Walther P99', '.44 Magnum' or 'Laser Rifle'. These, 
in turn would have instance-specific knowledge attached to them, such as the 'Laser Rifle' 
being 'fictional' (a property which itself may be stored elsewhere in memory as a high-
level schema) and also 'requires recharging'. These specific properties may operate in 
 
Figure 3: A procedural schema for making Mario move towards, 
jump onto and then enter a pipe in Super Mario World (Nintendo 
EAD, 1990). 
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addition to the inherited abstract properties within the schema by providing instance 
specific detailed information on a property, such as the specific type of ammunition that 
is required. They may also temporarily overwrite them such as the 'requires recharging' 
property overwriting the 'requires ammunition' property for the particular concept 
instance of the 'Laser Rifle'. 
This structure handles abstract concepts as well as physical object-based concepts such as 
'Firearms'. An abstract 'game' schema for example contains factual knowledge that an 
individual has stored about all types of games. This may have embedded within it less 
abstracted (but still high-level) schema relating to 'digital games', 'board games', 'live-
action role-playing games' and so forth. Then, specific concept instances of these types of 
game will be contained within these sub-schemas. The embedding of schemas in this 
manner may potentially be many more 'layers' deep but will contain specific concept 
instances at the lowest (least abstracted) level. Figure 4 for example represents only a 
small portion of the larger schema and concept network. A „Firearm‟ is a sub-schema of 
„Ranged Weapons‟ which in turn is a sub-schema of „Weapons‟, each of which would 
also contain abstract properties. As noted with procedural information, recall of semantic 
information alone is unlikely to be particularly useful, unless the game requires simplistic 
recall and statement of factual information (e.g. the penultimate stage of Banjo Kazooie 
(Rare, 1998) in which players must complete a game-based quiz). It is more likely to be 
recalled and integrated along with other memory types. 
 
Figure 4: Schematic organisation of concepts in semantic memory. 
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Schematic Organisation in Episodic Memory 
Episodic memories (sometimes referred to as „episodes‟) are „snapshots‟ of lived, 
spatiotemporally organised and contextualised events and experiences. Schemas drawn 
from other memory types during the formation of episodic memories contribute to the 
formation of the memory by being „baked in‟ to the episodic memory. This suggestion is 
supported by the work of Brewer and Treyens (1981). This work also supports the idea 
that an individual‟s existing prior knowledge at the time of an episodic memory‟s 
formation has an impact on what information is selected for storage in that episodic 
memory and thus, what information is available for later recall.  
For example, recalling seeing a computer in a particular office because offices tend to 
contain computers, despite that office not containing one. This example of recalling a 
particular episodic memory has been influenced by the abstract „office schema‟. During 
the recall and internal reconstruction of that memory, the general contents of the „office 
schema‟ are incorrectly incorporated alongside specific episodic memory contents. The 
reconstructive nature of episodic memory is supported by a range of literature, for 
example in studies of eyewitness testimony and memory in legal proceedings (Howe, 
2013, Loftus, 1981). Episodic memories therefore may be accurate internal 
representations of the original event, but may also be prone to recall errors introduced 
through the recall of information that is schema-relevant but not memory instance 
relevant (i.e. that has been „baked-in‟ to the encoded memory). 
Each episodic memory instance can be perceived as itself being a high level schema, as 
the information contained within each can be recalled and used to inform understanding 
of future similar (or apparently similar) events. This functionality is identical to schema-
based recall informing understanding of concepts stored in semantic memory when they 
are encountered in future. If an episodic memory contains inaccurate information 
however, then not only is recall of that memory affected but so too is the interpretation of 
any future experiences encountered that rely on the recall of that information. 
Expectations based on inaccurate information may lead to incorrect selection of 
appropriate actions or misunderstanding of meaning in future experiences, requiring those 
expectations to be updated through new learning.  
Episodic memory as separate from semantic memory is in some ways problematic. The 
apparent interdependence of episodic and semantic memory storage suggests that viewing 
them as entirely separate may not be an accurate interpretation (McKoon, Ratcliff and 
Dell, 1986). However, as Menon (2002) states, the interdependence may be necessary but 
clearly the functionality of each type of memory is different, which supports the 
perception of the two types as at least in some ways separated. 
SCHEMA-BASED MODEL OF LUDIC KNOWLEDGE CONSTRUCTION 
A schema-based model of ludic knowledge construction that more clearly defines the role 
of the integration of prior knowledge into understanding and the decision making process 
is now proposed (Figure 5). With reference to Mayer‟s (2001) model, sensory memory is 
retained to an extent in the form of sensory perception. Working memory is split into two 
primary components. Firstly, the Central Executive (CE), as per Baddeley‟s (1992) model 
of working memory, which acts as a decision making component. Secondly, the 
Multimodal Situational Schema Instantiation (MSSI) is then added, which draws together 
the multimodal prior knowledge stored in long-term memory.  
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The CE is a process coordinator, involved in planning and decision making, handling 
„novel‟ or demanding situations (e.g., the introduction of a new, more powerful enemy 
during a game) and in controlling or limiting habitual or „conditioned‟ responses to 
situations. The CE operates on the MSSI. The MSSI provides all necessary information 
(procedural, semantic, and episodic) to make sense of and respond to the current situation 
presented to the player. The MSSI itself is informed by the multimodal contents 
(procedural, semantic, and episodic; visual, auditory etc.) of the three individual long-
term memory stores. The MSSI can be equated to Neisser‟s (1976, p.56) statement that 
“the schema is not only the plan, but also the executor of the plan. It is a pattern of action, 
as well as a pattern for action”. The MSSI is prone to a level of inaccuracy (in the same 
manner as episodic memory and recall is) based on the information that it is drawing 
from memory in relation to the perceived stimulus. 
However, perception, thought and action can be viewed as an ongoing cycle. As Fuster 
(in Alloway and Alloway, 2013) explains, “the perception/action cycle is the circular 
cybernetic process of information between the human organism and its environment”. 
Disruptive design is also able to focus on the disruption of this cycle itself, as well as the 
disruption of the contents of the MSSI or the expectations that stem from it. The schema-
based model can be viewed as representing the flow of information and the activation of 
model components through a single cycle. „Stimulus‟ as stated previously is used here to 
indicate an instigator to action. Stimuli generally originate from outside of the body (i.e., 
from objects such as the game), although a stimulus may also be a lack of stimulus, as in 
a sensory deprivation environment. 
Further to stimuli originating „naturally‟ from the environment, the observed 
consequences of an action performed by the individual is also a stimulus (e.g. the 
observed outcome of attacking an enemy‟s weak spot and the observed outcome of 
attacking their armoured areas). In this case, the stimulus may inform further action, such 
 
Figure 5: Schema-based model of player learning. 
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as to keep attacking the weak spot, or to stop attacking the armoured areas, but may also 
inform knowledge construction and modification (i.e. learning or enhancing 
understanding) in all three memory stores. This could be procedural knowledge 
construction based on the success or failure of previous actions, semantic knowledge 
construction based on newly perceived concepts and concept instance properties, and 
episodic knowledge construction related to the particular event just experienced. 
A FRAMEWORK FOR SCHEMA-BASED DISRUPTIVE GAME DESIGN 
Within the schema-based model, three particular modalities of potential disruption can be 
identified. Encoding disruption operates on the initial encoding of information regarding 
a new stimulus. Purposeful presentation of ambiguous stimuli (e.g. a previously unheard 
sound without an obvious source) to a player requires initial encoding to be based on 
existing knowledge. As previously described, such existing knowledge may be abstract 
(e.g. the „office schema‟ example) and thus lead to inaccuracies in the newly encoded 
memory. Future encounters with that stimulus thus potentially require a greater degree of 
re-learning. Encoding disruption may also be achieved by preventing a player focusing 
attention on a stimulus (i.e. distracting the player with other stimuli). 
Recall disruption operates on information recalled from long-term memory regarding the 
perception of game stimuli in terms of their properties, or the context in which they are 
presented. Purposely presenting players with previously encountered stimuli that behave 
differently or that have otherwise different properties to previous encounters (e.g. a non-
player-character that unpredictably switches between „friendly‟ and „hostile‟) increases 
the likelihood of recalling information that is expected to be accurate but in fact is not. 
This will potentially require a greater degree of cognitive engagement regarding decisions 
made in relation to the stimulus, as well as potentially require frequent re-learning. 
Lastly, action plan disruption operates on the results of player inputs. If initial encoding 
has not been disrupted and recall has not been disrupted, the MSSI should in theory 
contain an appropriate „action plan‟. This action plan can be disrupted if the result of an 
action based on it does not correspond to previously experienced results of that action. 
This form of disruption has the potential to be particularly effective. Players may need to 
re-evaluate their understanding of the action they selected in a number of ways; whether 
they misinterpreted the stimulus, whether they decided upon an incorrect response, or 
whether they performed an appropriate response but the performance itself was incorrect. 
These three modalities of disruption may operate on any of the three long-term memory 
stores previously defined following Tulving‟s (1985) work. Procedural disruption may 
target knowledge of appropriate actions and processes applicable to a perceived stimulus. 
Semantic disruption may target knowledge of facts, concepts and concept properties and 
thus, the semantic understanding of objects and phenomena in the world. Episodic 
disruption may target lived experiences and include elements of both procedural and 
semantic disruption but contextualised with spatiotemporal information.  
The MSSI formation provides the primary mechanism through which disruptive game 
design has an impact on the player‟s gameplay experience. The MSSI is comprised of 
multimodal prior knowledge drawn from the different memory stores that attempts to 
provide the most appropriate and accurate context for understanding and responding to 
the current situation. Identification and recall of knowledge that is „most appropriate‟ and 
„most accurate‟ for a given situation must also be defined in order to present a usable 
framework for disruptive game design. This identification and recall process can be 
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understood from the perspectives of both encoding specificity (Einstein and McDaniel, 
2010, Tulving and Thomson, 1973) and spreading activation (Collins and Loftus, 1975).  
Encoding specificity suggests that knowledge is stored along with contextual information 
in episodic memory and that recall is improved if the current context in which recall is 
occurring matches the contextual information stored at the time of encoding.  Spreading 
activation suggests that stored information in memory is „activated‟, or recalled, through 
a series of associative links between schemas and concepts. The initial stimulus activates 
directly relevant stored information, which in turn activates closely associated 
information, spreading outwards from the original activation point with activation 
strength decreasing the further from that point the activation process spreads. 
With this context-dependency and activation process in mind, ludic knowledge 
construction and recall can be categorised into the construction and recall of three broad 
ludic knowledge types. Knowledge related to the current game being played can be 
termed intraludic knowledge; for example, the properties of a particular gun in a 
particular game. Knowledge related to other games can be termed transludic knowledge; 
for example, more abstract knowledge relating to the „gun‟ concept across multiple 
games. Lastly, knowledge that is not related to games can be termed extraludic 
knowledge; for example, knowledge regarding the meaning of the word „gun‟ abstracted 
from any specific object or ludic context. These ludic knowledge types exist within each 
of the three long-term memory stores, resulting in nine categories of memory that can 
provide knowledge that informs the MSSI during a single cycle. These categories are 
defined and further explained, with examples, using a short case study of Amnesia: A 
Machine for Pigs (The Chinese Room, 2013). 
Case Study of Amnesia: A Machine for Pigs 
Amnesia: A Machine for Pigs (AAMFP) is a sequel to Amnesia: The Dark Descent 
(Frictional Games, 2010) (ATDD). AAMFP is a narrative driven, first-person survival 
horror game with gameplay focused on exploration of the environment to uncover and 
piece together the game‟s story, while attempting to avoid enemies using stealth. Using 
two components of AAMFP, a game-based application of the previously described 
memory categories is explained, followed by examples of the implementation of different 
modalities of disruption. 
Knowledge Types in Memory Relating to Game Mechanics 
A key mechanic that enables the avoidance of enemies in AAMFP is a Victorian electric 
lantern that the player-character carries. Prior knowledge from different memory 
categories can be applied when attempting to understand the functionality and use of this 
mechanic. These categories, combining memory stores and ludic knowledge types, are 
summarised in Table 2, with examples of stored knowledge. 
When players encounter the „Lantern‟ mechanic in AAMFP for the first time, knowledge 
in the TRANS- and EX- categories will be recalled to provide a context with which to 
understand the intraludic mechanic. For example, from TRANS-P knowledge, the player 
may easily transfer understanding of the ability to equip and un-equip the lantern by 
pressing a key, as in other games. Those players with TRANS-P knowledge acquired 
through playing ATDD specifically (TRANS-E knowledge) may further transfer 
understanding of the default key with which to do this, as both games utilise the same 
control scheme. This requires minimal new learning as knowledge can readily be 
transferred from TRANS- categories and found to be effective in selecting appropriate 
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Intraludic 
(in a specific game) 
Transludic 
(in other games) 
Extraludic 
(outside of games) 
Procedural 
 
(Knowledge 
of how to…) 
INT-P 
… equip/un-equip the 
lantern in AAMFP 
and the key required 
to do so. 
TRANS-P 
…use similar mechanics 
in other games, such as 
equipping/un-equipping 
the similar lantern in 
ATDD. 
EX-P 
… use a lantern in the 
real-world. 
May also include 
knowledge of using 
similar objects (such as a 
torch) in the real-world. 
Semantic 
 
(Knowledge 
of Concepts 
and Concept 
Properties…) 
INT-S 
…(e.g. within the 
player‟s „lantern‟ 
schema, a concept 
instance for the 
„AAMFP in-game 
lantern‟ with 
associated concept 
properties). 
TRANS-S 
… acquired in other 
games (e.g. lanterns in 
other games may have 
the property „requires 
fuel‟, which AAMFP‟s 
does not). 
EX-S 
…acquired outside of 
games (e.g. a specific 
concept instance for „my 
torch‟, with properties 
such as „requires a 9V 
battery‟, or „has an 
adjustable beam‟). 
Episodic 
 
(Collections 
of 
knowledge…) 
INT-E 
…relating to specific 
instances of using the 
lantern within 
scenarios in AAMFP. 
TRANS-E 
…relating to using 
similar mechanics in 
other games in particular 
instances. 
EX-E 
…relating to the process 
of interacting with 
similar non-game 
mechanisms or concepts 
in specific instances. 
 
Table 2: Memory categories storing different information relating to 
the ‘Lantern’ mechanic in AAMFP. 
 actions with minimal adaptation. For players unable to rely on TRANS- category 
knowledge (for example if this is the first game a player has ever played, or if the player 
has not had experience playing ATDD), EX- category knowledge is employed. This may 
include relatable but not identical knowledge, such as using a battery-powered torch in 
the real world. This may enable the transfer of key semantic information about the lantern 
as an object (e.g. it can be on or off, it produces light) but may not allow transfer of 
relevant procedural knowledge, as a torch is not turned on and off by pressing a key on a 
keyboard. Once a player has encountered the „Lantern‟ mechanic once, INT- category 
knowledge begins to form and be refined with experiences encountered as the player 
progresses through the game.  
Encoding Disruption could be achieved by presenting players with game components that 
are challenging to contextualise when first encountered through reliance on TRANS- and 
EX- category knowledge transfer. Changing the properties or presentational context of 
seemingly established components within the same game (thus disrupting INT- category 
knowledge) provides a basis for Recall Disruption and, potentially, Action Plan 
disruption as well if the changed component responds differently to player actions 
previously performed towards it. 
Knowledge 
Type 
Memory 
Store 
Knowledge 
Type 
Memory 
Store 
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Previously (Howell, 2011, p.7) it was suggested that disruptive game design may aim to 
make small changes to a large number of different game components, or make large 
changes to a small number of different game components. This suggestion hides an 
additional layer of complexity however. It is not merely the small or large changes made 
by the designer, nor is it the amount of changes made that are important. Rather, it is the 
perceived notable and/or lasting impact of the changes made, from the player‟s 
perspective, which is of particular interest. 
For example a disruptive design element may be minor in terms of the work required to 
implement it but may have a significant impact on the player during gameplay. Similarly, 
a disruptive design element may require comparatively more work to implement to 
achieve a less notable, or less long-lasting impact on the player. Each of these scenarios 
(as well as low workload, low impact, and high workload, high impact scenarios) has 
potential to be put to practical use with different aims in mind. The following examples 
demonstrate two such practical implementations within AAMFP. 
Disrupting Player Knowledge of Enemy-Proximity Warning Mechanic 
Other than performing the function of allowing the player to see in dark environments, 
the lantern also serves as a warning device that can alert the player to nearby enemy 
threats. It does this by flashing at different rates and intensities depending on enemy 
proximity. This particular mechanic may be contextualised by players using similar 
mechanics in other games (e.g. the radio in Silent Hill (Konami Computer Entertainment 
Tokyo, 1999) that emits static based on enemy proximity), but this relies on players 
having specific TRANS- category knowledge from specific games. Thus, it is likely that a 
degree of new learning will have to occur in order to initially integrate this AAMFP 
mechanic.  
However, once the mechanic is introduced and a range of INT- category knowledge has 
been formed, the game presents scenarios to the player which actively disrupt the „rules‟ 
of the mechanic as previously encountered (i.e. recall disruption; the disruption of 
established properties of a game component). The lantern begins to exhibit its flashing 
behaviour in areas that do not appear to contain an enemy threat. The link between enemy 
proximity and lantern flashing rates in some areas that do contain threats also becomes 
less clearly defined, with intense flashing not always meaning that an enemy is very close 
to the player, for example. These changes to the mechanic are presented in segments (as 
opposed to being „random‟) which means that players are potentially able to re-learn the 
„rules‟ (and thus reformulate their understanding) of the mechanic as they move between 
segments. Allowing players an opportunity to actively re-learn and form new knowledge 
is critical, even if the newly formed knowledge is only accurate for a short time. If 
knowledge is disrupted in a seemingly random manner, players may become frustrated 
due to perceiving any attempt to learn as futile.  
As identified in the schema-based model, different types of knowledge construction occur 
in relation to each of the three memory types (procedural, semantic and episodic). 
Disruption of knowledge increases the likelihood of different methods of knowledge 
construction needing to be undertaken by players. These can be defined using the terms 
provided by Rumelhart and Norman (1976, 1981); accretion, tuning and restructuring.  
Accretion-based knowledge construction as previously described is incremental, 
modifying existing stored information with minor adjustments or adding supporting 
information. Tuning-based knowledge construction occurs when the structure (rather than 
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just the content) of a schema network must be modified in order to support new 
information. Lastly, restructuring occurs when information cannot be satisfactorily 
accommodated through accretion or tuning and requires the creation of a new high-level 
schema specifically for the new information. Disruptive game design can thus be 
considered as an approach that encourages a greater number of occurrences of tuning and 
restructuring, rather than a reliance primarily on accretion-based learning, a property of 
„conservative‟ design. 
The enemy-proximity warning mechanic demonstrates a game component that 
encourages a low level of accretion-based knowledge construction (e.g. adding a new 
concept instance to the „lantern‟ schema to describe the „AAMFP in-game lantern‟) 
alongside more cognitively engaging tuning-based knowledge construction (e.g. linking 
the „AAMFP in-game lantern‟ concept instance to the „warning system‟ and „flashing 
light‟ concepts upon discovering that functionality during gameplay. 
The enemy-proximity warning mechanic is then an example of low workload, high 
impact disruption. The implementation of the mechanic, once the initial game code for 
detecting enemy proximity and handling the lantern flashing was in place, only required 
simple adjustments to parameters when players entered and exited different volumes 
within the game‟s environments. However, the impact of disrupting knowledge of this 
mechanic can be felt by players throughout the entirety of the game as players move 
between segments which manipulate the mechanic‟s „rules‟ in different ways. This 
demonstrates ongoing recall disruption and thus, ongoing restructuring, throughout the 
entire play time of the game. 
Disrupting Player Knowledge of Euclidean Space 
A second AAMFP example focused instead on high workload, high impact disruption can 
be identified in the occasional use of „impossible architecture‟. This takes the form of 
apparent non-Euclidean environments (whereby corridors, rooms, walls and doors shift 
their locations, or connect to one another in configurations that change and distort as the 
player progresses) and also, at a simpler level, objects and entities that appear and 
disappear seemingly without cause (what can be referred to as „object consistency‟). 
Shifting corridors occur only a few times during the entire game and only significantly 
affect the environment on one occasion, approximately half way through the game in the 
„Tunnels‟ level. This placement allows enough time for players to form apparently 
accurate schema-based intraludic knowledge regarding the nature of the physical, spatial 
properties of the game world. When faced with a situation in which corridors and rooms 
shift and reconfigure themselves, players are unable to use INT- category knowledge to 
contextualise it; a further example of recall disruption. They are unlikely to be able to use 
TRANS- category knowledge (although such architecture shifting is not wholly original 
and thus may have been experienced before in other games; see Antichamber (Bruce, 
2013) for example) and are unable to use EX- category knowledge because such 
behaviour is impossible in reality. This therefore requires significant re-learning of the 
physical laws of the game world and thus adjustment of INT- category knowledge. The 
change in physical properties of the game world is not based on any clear „rules‟ or 
contextualising information; there is no definitive in-game explanation for the change. 
Thus, the initial encoding of this new physical property knowledge is based on 
ambiguous information, providing an example of encoding disruption. This newly formed 
knowledge is now recalled to the MSSI during further gameplay. While such architectural 
shifting is not used to the same extent at any other point following this, the re-learned 
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knowledge creates expectations of it possibly occurring again, thus potentially 
influencing how players play from this point onwards. 
Disrupting knowledge of the spatial properties of the game world demonstrates a game 
component that has a high probability to require restructuring to occur in order to 
facilitate knowledge construction (e.g., if it is the first time (in their ludic and non-ludic 
experiences) that a player encounters the concept of „non-Euclidean‟ architecture). This 
example of disruption can be seen as high workload, as it requires significant work to 
implement within the game engine. It is high impact due to its disruption of multiple 
knowledge types (i.e. it cannot be immediately contextualised (by most players) using 
INT-, TRANS- OR EX- category knowledge). „Impact‟ more generally may be considered 
in terms of immediate gameplay impact (e.g. shifting architecture), lasting gameplay 
impact (e.g. consistently manipulating the parameters controlling the lantern mechanic), 
or lasting cognitive impact, such as changes being made to the player‟s expectations that 
influence future game experiences both in the current game being played and in other 
games that the player may play. 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
A proposed cognitive model and theoretical framework through which to implement a 
disruptive game design approach has been presented. This approach disrupts schema-
based player knowledge and expectations of in-game stimuli (i.e. anything in a game that 
requires a player to actively attempt to understand its meaning). This may include such 
things as game mechanics, game entities (e.g. weapons or enemies), the game‟s narrative, 
or an element thereof. The three modes of disruption identified operate on knowledge 
stored in the three long-term memory stores. The modes of disruption influence the 
player‟s ability to utilise varying degrees of intraludic, transludic and extraludic 
knowledge and thus have an impact on the methods of knowledge construction the player 
is required to perform during gameplay. The framework aims to offer a perspective for 
considering the broader concept of „conservatism‟ in game design by promoting games 
that require greater cognitive engagement from players via a higher rate of learning and 
re-learning, or re-evaluation, of knowledge during gameplay. This in turn provides a 
greater opportunity for such games to meet the higher level cognitive needs of players, 
than other „conservative‟, highly „player-centric‟ or highly „accessible‟ games. 
Ongoing work aims to analyse and assess the player-perceived and player-reported 
impact of the disruptive game design approach employed in the design and development 
of AAMFP. The results of this analysis will provide evidence as to the future potential 
use of such a design approach. There is also potential to investigate the concepts 
presented via the schema-based model of knowledge construction and recall (i.e. modes 
of disruption, ludic knowledge types and methods of knowledge construction during 
gameplay) as a means of analysing, rather than designing, games. Such analysis may 
provide insight into design issues in other games such as player frustration, confusion or 
misunderstanding of game components. 
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